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Water Pricing and Rent Seeking in California Agriculture

Introduction
Without irrigation water, agriculture in California would be little more
than limited livestock grazing and some dryland farming of cereal crops.

With

irrigation water, California produces over 200 crops and is the leading
agricultural state with nearly $4 billion in sales in 1980.

The state's

gross cash receipts from farm sales have consistently approached 10 percent of
the U.S. total every year since 1960.
Of course, water is only one of several crucial inputs utilized in
agricultural production--others are land; capital in form of machinery, tools
and implements; energy; chemicals for fertilizer and pest control; and perhaps
most important, human effort.

If production is profitable, all factors must

be paid at least their opportunity costs if they are to be used on a
continuing basis.

Those existing in relatively fixed (inelastic) supply will

earn economic rents if there are revenues left after the variable factors have
been paid.

Economic rent may be defined for our purposes as the difference

between what a productive factor is worth in use and what it costs.

If a

factor of production is relatively constraining in determining the quantity,
quality, and location of output, and is priced far below its economic value,
economic rents will tend to be large and persistent through time.
In the irrigation economy of the west, water, probably more than any
other factor of production, fits the description of a constraining input
(described in the previous paragraph) that is frequently priced below its
value in use.

The control of water, therefore, provides access to enormous

magnitudes of economic rent and is for this reason a hot political issue in
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the west.

Institutional arrangements in the form of water law, water pricing

policies, acreage ownership limitations on land receiving subsidized federal
water, lobbying for new water development, and land allocation rules have all
played their roles in determining the distribution as well as the size of
these economic rents.

It is the thesis of this paper that some of these

institutional arrangements have seriously misallocated water in terms of
diminishing the value of the economic product yielded by water and its
complementary inputs far below what would have been attainable under optimal
water allocation.
Pricing policy is a critical issue that encompasses many other
water-related problems.

If water is not price-rationed to where it is most

valuable, then some other rationing schemes must be employed to allocate it.
If nonprice allocation criteria are used, what efficiency losses may result
therefrom?

For example, without market prices to reveal what the value of

water is, how shall it be determined whether or not new water development is
economically feasible?

(Gardner, 1981).

The paper will first demonstrate that farmers are price responsive in
their use of irrigation water.

The literature that reports estimates of

elasticity of demand will be reviewed.

This will be followed by an empirical

analysis of the main types of responses to higher water prices:

(1) use less

water on a given crop, (2) change irrigation technology, (3) shift water
applications to more water-efficient crops, and (4) change crop mix to
higher-valued crops.

A final major section discusses the water allocating

institutions in California, how their pricing and allocating rules misallocate
water, and what the implications are for the distribution of economic rents.
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Water Prices and Use Rates in California Agriculture
Although some argue that water is a commodity that could be most
efficiently allocated via the market place where price would direct it to its
highest and best use, it has almost always been considered different from
marketable commodities.

Historically, its seeming abundance contributed to

its allocation at prices reflecting the costs of capture and distribution and
often unrelated to its economic value.

Legal criteria, such as "beneficial

use" determined eligible user groups.
To most water planners "demand" for water frequently means projected
"requirements" or "needs" for people and plants.

In agriculture, water

planners and engineers tend to think of irrigation water in terms of per-acre
"needs" or "requirements" of the crops in an area--e.g., an acre of barley in
Kern County, California, requires 1.5 acre-feet of water in a growing season;
an acre of alfalfa, 4.5 acre-feet.
The California Department of Water Resources (DWR), the state agency
responsible for supplying water to farmers and city dwellers through its State
Water Project, bases its estimates of water demand on the apparent ability of
farmers to put it to profitable use (per acre agricultural receipts for a crop
minus its nonwater costs divided by the number of acre-feet needed to grow
that particular crop).

Crops for which the calculated ability to pay exceeds

the water cost involved enter the projections; those with lower capacities, do
not.

The demand for water, then, according to DWR, is computed by summing

over the products of water requirements and acreages of those crops "able to
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pay" for the water (Willis, 1972).

The quantity of wter utilized per acre is

assumed to be fixed for a given profitable crop.I
Partly because the "water-is-different syndrome" is so prominent (Kelso,
1967), the solution to water shortages that occur through time as "need" grows
has been to develop new water supplies rather than to raise prices--to
increase the supply to meet the fixed demand.

The economist would find this

policy quite unobjectionable so long as it could be shown that the "new" water
was worth more in use than its development and distribution costs.

This is

precisely the aspect that is too often overlooked in water development
decision making, however.
It is easy to demonstrate that water users are responsive to price.

The

.

contrast in water use between New York City with an unmetered water supply and
Detroit with universal metering was cited by Chiogioji and Chiogioji (1973).
During a critical water shortage in 1949-1950, New Yorkers reduced per capita
consumption from 85 to 60 gallons a day in response to a vigorous water
conservation campaign.

Meanwhile, Detroit water consumers, comparable to

those in New York in many ways other than in being metered, consumed only
49.5 gallons per capita per day without any nonprice pressures to conserve.
There are a number of studies that have attempted to estimate farmers'
responsiveness to the price of irrigation water.

The studies which were done

in differing areas of California with different cropping patterns over a
period of more than a decade all indicated considerable farmer response to

1 such prescriptions for water use are designed to maximize yield not
profit (Ayer and Hoyt). Only with a zero water price are the two objectives
one and the same. Generally, farmers stop using water at the profit
mazimizing point (where the value of the marginal product equals the water
price) which is short of the yield maximizing point (where the marginal
product of water is zero).
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changes in water price.

Although the findings differed in the degree of price

responsiveness, together they contradict a widespread view that farmers are
insensitive to water price changes in their production decisions.
Linear programming models were constructed by Moore (1962) for farms
of different sizes on the eastern side of the San Joaquin Valley in Tulare
County, California.

Optimum crop programs were calculated for each model as

irrigation water prices were raised from zero to about $30 per acre-foot.

A

given crop mix and its associated water "requirements" remained optimum over a
small range in price creating a stepped demand schedule for water.

The

schedules were aggregated over the size groups, a linear regession was fitted
and elasticities were computed.

Elasticities ranged from quite inelastic

(-0.14) at a low water price ($5.00 per acre-foot) through quite elastic
(-1.58) at $25.00 per acre-foot.I

For the entire range of prices considered

(zero to $30 dollars per acre-foot), elasticity was -0.65--that is, for a
10 percent increase in price, about a 6.5 percent decrease in quantity could
be expected.
In 1963, Moore and Hedges fit two quadratic regression equations to two
distinct price segments of the same aggregate demand schedule.

The resulting

elasticities were -0.188 for the lower segment and -0.702 for the upper, with
the overall elasticity again being -0.65.

In a cross-sectional analysis of

34 California water districts, Bain, Caves, and Margolis (1966) also found a
price elasticity of -0.64.

!An elastic demand (greater than 1.0 in absolute terms) means that for a
1 percent change in price, a greater than 1 percent change in quantity
demanded would be expected. While an inelastic demand (less than 1.0 in
absolute terms) means less than a 1 percent change in quantity for the
1 percent price change, some responsiveness is nevertheless in evidence. It
is only when the elasticity reaches zero that complete insensitivity to price
is indicated.
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In a 3,220 equation, 5,426 variable linear programming model, Heady et
al. (1973) tested for the impacts of alternative futures on the demand for
water for agriculture in 17 western states.

As

water price increased from an

average of $7 per acre-foot to $30, irrigated acreage was reduced an estimated
14.8 million acres; dryland farming increased about 15 million acres--about a
one-for-one substitution.
altered.

Of course, the crop mix was correspondingly

Carson (1979) computed the elasticities implied by the Heady model

for four incremental water price changes.

As price was raised from $7 to $30

per acre-foot the elasticity estimates increased from -0.17 to -0.56
with an overall average of -0.37.
Using shadow prices from linear programming solutions to a water
quality-crop production model for Imperial County, California, Moore, Snyder,
and Sun (1974) found that for quantities greater than one million acre-feet,
demand was quite elastic.

At the then current, low price of $2.35 per

acre-foot, however, and with much smaller quantities of water, demand was
relatively inelastic, even though the water cost was less than its value in
use.
In evaluating regional resource use for agricultural production in
California in 1961-1965 and in 1980 (projected), a spatial linear programming
location model was constructed by Shumway, King, and Carter (1970).
Particular attention was directed in this study to water pricing on the west
side of the San Joaquin Valley in two of the model's 95 assumed homogeneous
production areas (HPA).

Two demand functions were estimated using the

parametric program observations for each HPA, and later Shumway (1970) fitted
a single equation to the data points for both HPAs.

In contrast to the

several studies reviewed above, these estimates indicated quite an elastic
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water price response.

In the two-equation model, five out of six point

estimates had an absolute value greater than one.

The exception was -0.56 in

one HPA at a very low water price--$4.70 per acre-foot.
$19.36 in the other HPA, the estimate was -2.32.

At a water price of

In the single-equation

model, at a deflated water price (1965 dollars) of $4 per acre-foot, the
elasticity estimate was -0.48, becoming unitary (i.e., -1.0) at a price of
about $8.50, and elastic at higher prices.

At $17.00, the elasticity estimate

was -2.03.
What do these "high" elasticities mean?

For one thing, Shumway, King,

and Carter concluded that farmers in these two HPAs would not be using all the
water DWR was planning to send them--at the price DWR was planning to charge.
According to their study results, the marginal cost of water to the farmer
would have to be reduced between $4 and $6 per acre-foot (from a contractual
price of $14.70 per acre-foot in one HPA and $19.36 in the other) before DWR's
projected one-half million acres would be brought into production.
It has been demonstrated recently by Howitt, Watson, and Adams (1980)
that the various linear programming (LP) approaches reported above may
seriously underestimate price elasticities.

They show that the quadratic

programming (QP) method, which incorporates product demand functions into the
objective function, will yield elasticities for water that are more elastic
than will the LP method on the same data.

As an example, a statewide model of

nine California field crops and 28 vegetable cropsl was estimated using both
the LP and QP approaches with the latter indeed yielding more elastic
estimates.

In the water price range from $25 to $35, the LP derived

elasticity was -0.97; the QP estimate was -1.50.

!perennial crops were afforded full water allocations and were not
included in the model.
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There are extremely important implications for policy in these elasticity
numbers.

For example, as Howitt, Watson, and Adams suggest, if demand for

irrigation water is as elastic in the $25 to $35 price range as the numbers
presented indicate, then as State Water Project prices are renegotiated in the
next few years, farmers may reduce their water use by a far greater amount
than expected by the water planners.

Such a reduction could "offset the

current predictions of severe supply shortfalls calculated under the
assumption of inelastic 'needs' for agriculture."

(p. 627)

In fact, if the demand for irrigation water is elastic (greater than 1.0
in absolute terms) the reductions in quantities demanded in response to price
increases will reduce the total water bill.

Districts selling water will

receive smaller total revenues and will probably have to alter the way water
is paid for.
Generations of economists have been taught that elasticity increases as
we move from the short to the long run.

In agricultural water use

specifically, Johnston (1968) pointed out that demand in the short run is
almost always more inelastic than in the long run.

If the technological base

of production in agriculture is in place (for example, the orchard is
planted), demand for irrigation water may not be very price responsive.

In

the long run, however, changes can (and will) be made in this base if water is
priced at a higher level.
The same point was made by Shumway (1973) in comparing his more elastic
estimates with Moore and Hedges' inelastic ones.

The study area for the

latter was fully developed for agricultural production with the existing water
distribution system well in place.

By contrast, the west side of the San

Joaquin Valley used in Shumway's model was "predominantly barren of
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agricultural production.

Consequently, water distribution facilities must be

constructed • • • and would not be constructed if the price of water appeared
too high." (p. 199) This means that demand for irrigation water for
undeveloped land is especially price responsive.
The conclusion that has emerged from this literature review of
agricultural water use in California is clear:

demand for irrigation water is

more price responsive than is generally believed.

Underestimating this

responsiveness can result in serious resource misallocations--using scarce and
valuable nonwater resources in unwarranted and premature water development.
It has been shown that farmers respond to water price increases by
cutting back in water use.

The next section of the paper indicates more

precisely how their production decisions accommodate this action.
Farmers Responses to Increases in Water Price
Suppose that water to the farmer became very expensive (say, $75 per
acre-foot) but he could have all he might want at that price.
react in his irrigation practice?

Three responses seem likely:

How might he
(1) he might

apply less water to a given crop (possibly putting it under stress), (2) he
might utilize a different (more efficient) irrigation technology and/or water
application practice, and (3) he might choose a different cropping pattern.
These issues will be discussed in turn.
Water Price and Application Rates
Plant growth is determined largely by the amount of water available to
the plant in the root zone during the growing season.

The amount of water

available in the root zone depends on the quantity that gets there from
natural precipitation and the amount supplied from irrigation.
of the soil to retain water is also an important factor.

The capacity

The plant uses some
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water in the process of photosynthesis, but most is transpired from the
plant's leaves.
surface.

Other water is lost through evaporation from the soil

Table 1 shows seasonal and annual rates of potential

evapotranspiration (ET) for various regions in California.

The numbers in the

table are maximum amounts of water that plants will use if adequate soil
moisture is available, and if foliage covers all or nearly all of the ground
surface.

Under these conditions, approximately 90 percent of the water loss

is by transpiration.

Other factors determining ET rates are solar radiation,

air moisture, temperature, wind speed, reflectiveness of the ground surface,
and the way and time interval over which water is delivered to the land.

The

numbers in Table 1 reveal great differences in potential ET rates in the
various regions of the state of California with the largest being in the
southern desert.
Not much can be done to change basic ET.

There are, however, adaptive

strategies for maximizing production with limited supplies of water or for
higher-cost water.
lower.

Crops can be moved toward the cool season when ET is

Table 2 lists the seasonal evapotranspiration (ET) requirements of the

major crops in the San Joaquin Valley.

It is possible to change total water

use by varying the types of crops grown, changing the acreages in the various
crops, and shortening the growth duration of crops.
Of primary interest is the relationship between water applied and yield;
the former largely influencing the marginal water cost and the latter, the
marginal benefits from incremental applications of water.

Research at the

University of California indicates that water applications 10 percent below
that producing maximum yields would reduce alfalfa yields by 10 percent;
cotton, 12.5 percent; corn, 12.5 percent; grain sorghum, 10 percent; pinto
beans, 23.5 percent; and pink beans, 21 percent (Stewart, 1977).

Some

preliminary results of continuing research suggest that "stress" irrigation
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Table 1
Seasonal and Annual Potential Evapotranspiration
Rates in Californiaa
Season

November-March

April-October

Annual

-----------------inches---------------Northwestern
mountain valleys

5.1

37.1

42.2

North coast-coastal valleys
and plains

5.3

20.8

26.1

North coast-interior valleys

6.3

34.9

41.2

Sacramento Valley

8.5

40.7

49.2

San Joaquin Valley

7.9

40.7

48.6

Central coast-coastal valleys
and plains

10.7

30.6

41.3

Central coast-interior valleys

10.8

37.5

48.3

South coast-coastal valleys
and plains

12.1

32.3

44.4

South coast-interior valleys

11.5

37.9

49.4

Southern California
desert

17.7

65.1

82.8

aThese are the rates of water loss one would observe from a
well-watered lawn.
Source:

Vegetative Water Use in California, 1974, Bulletin No.
113-3, Departmentof Water Resources (Sacramento,
California: The Resources Agency, 1975).
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Table 2
Evapotranspiration of Major Field Crops
in the San Joaquin Valley

Season

Days

Total
ET (in.)

Small Grains

November through May 15
December through May
January through June

200
180
180

13
16
21

Beans (Pinto)

April through July
May to August 15
June 15 through September

120
110
110

21
20
18

Grain Sorghum

May through September
June 15 through October

150
140

24
18

Corn

March 15 to August 15
April 15 to September 15
May 15 through September
June to October 15

150
150
140
140

27
28
24
23

Cotton

March through September
March 15 to October 15
May through October

180
180
180

31
31
32

Sugarbeets

February through August
March 15 to September 15
May through January
June 15 to March 15

210
180
280
300

36
35
36
29

Rice

April through August
May through September

150
150

39
39

Crop
Annual crops

Perennial crops
Alfalfa
Pasture
Grapes

All year, but with winter dormant period
All year, but slower growth in winter
March through mid-November
Wine, raisin
Table

Deciduous Orchards February-March through November
Clean cultivated
With cover crop
Source:

David C. Davenport and Robert M. Hagan, "Assessing
Potentials for Agricultural Water Conservation,"
Western Water, November-December 1979, pp. 6-11.

48
49
30
40

36
up to 48

might be used with perennial crops such as raisin and wine grapes and
almonds--but only in areas where sufficient water is available during the
winter to satisfy leaching requirements.

Unfortunately, the economics of

putting the plant under some stress in order to save costly water have not
been worked out.
returns.

Income may be higher or lower depending on costs and

The important point, however, is the acknowledgement that a rational

farmer might very well apply less irrigation water to his crops at higher
water prices than at lower ones.
Water Price and Irrigation Practice
As

argued earlier, to the rational farmer the price of water may have a

significant influence on his choice of irrigation practice and technology.

If

water is cheap, the irrigation technique and the frequency of application may
be relatively inefficient in water use but quite efficient in economizing on
other scarce inputs, such as labor and capital.

The farmer might choose

timing and longevity of irrigations that use more water but are more
convenient for him.

He may not find it profitable to keep his irrigation

system in good repair so as to avoid leaks and seepage losses.

He may have

little incentive to invest in the control of thirsty phreatophytes or to
switch to expensive but water-sparing irrigation systems such as sprinkler or
drip.
The water supply agencies (generally, water districts as established by
law and described more fully later in the paper) use pricing practices that
cause the water costs to farmers to vary widely.

In 1975, in Kern County,

California, total surface water costs per acre-foot varied between $6.68, in
the Delano-Earlimart District, and $51.07, in the Cawelo District (Table 3 and
Figure 1).

The disparity in groundwater costs was somewhat less--$16.05 in
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Table 3
Variable and Total Water Costs and Irrigation Efficiency
Kern County, 1975
Surface
water

Groundwater
C
D
Total
Variable
Total
Variable
cost
cost
cost
cost
--------------per acre foot-------------A

B

Irrigation
efficiency
y

--percent--

Arvin-Edison

14.93

20.83

Bell ridge

25.18

25.18

71

Berrenda Mesa

12.53

33.51

75

5.67

8.68

10.60

16.05

65

Buttonwillow

19 .62

20.75

15.73

21.23

65

Cawelo

46.00

51.07

22.80

30.60

83

3.47

6.68

19.54

25.47

65

15.83

28.20

9.93

16.60

61

8.22

ll.67

12.03

17.32

64

31.31

40.03

77

Buena Vista

Delano-Earlimart
Henry Miller
Kern Delta
Kern-Tulare

22.88

30.51

69

Lost Hills

ll.87

20.04

16.80

24.55

67

North Kern

10.27

ll.94

16.25

22.44

65

14.46

20.32

65

20.64

26.75

67

Rosedale-Rio Bravo

13.94

19 .12

64

Semi tropic

14.19

19. 77

65

Pond Poso
Rag Gulch

35.60

35.60

Shafter-Wasco

4.01

8.15

19.08

26.79

65

Southern San Joaquin

6.00

7.43

21.87

28.27

66

18.24

24.48

65

23.35

31.70

71

West Kern County
Wheeler Ridge-Maricopa
Source:

44.92

46.96

William D; Watson, Carole Frank Nuckton, and Richard E. Howitt, Crop
Production and Water Supply Characteristics of Kern County, Giannini
Foundation Information Series No. 80-1, Division of Agricultural Sciences
Bulletin No. 1895 (University of California: Giannini Foundation,
April 1980).
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Buena Vista to $40.03 in the Kern-Tulare district (Watson, Nuckton, and Howitt
1980).
Total water costs to the farmer, of course, can be broken down into
component parts, only some of which are generally relevant to his decision as
to the quantity of water he will demand.

It is the outlay associated with an

incremental unit of water (marginal cost) that must be compared with its
value.
Water districts vary somewhat in pricing practices utilized to recover
their costs of supplying water.
the total water bill:

In most instances, three components make up

"(l) A water toll charge--'user charge'--is commonly

levied directly by the water district as a variable cost based on the number
of acre-feet drawn.

(2) A water availability and general service charge is

imposed, usually on a per-acre or per-value basis.

This is a fixed cost not

related to ·the amount of water delivered and is used to service district
and pay operating, maintenance, and salary costs.

debts •

(3) Finally,

there are a number of indirect costs which may or may not be included in the
district's quoted farm gate water costs.

Such charges levied by the county

tax assessor are paid as taxes rather than as direct water costs."
et al.,

(Watson

p. 47-48)

In Table 3, columns A and Care the "user charges" or variable costs per
acre-foot of water, whether it be surface water (column A) or groundwater
(column C).

In addition to these variable costs, the fixed costs involved in

items (2) and (3) above have been calculated as a per acre-foot charge and
appear as a total cost for each district in columns Band D.

In the case of

groundwater, this includes the fixed cost in pumps, wells, etc.
There is great variation among districts between variable and fixed costs
in Kern County.

For example, the Rag Gulch District charged $35.60 as a water
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toll per acre-foot, and there was no fixed per-acre charge.

Berrenda Mesa, on

the other hand, collected $12.53 per acre-foot as a variable water toll and
$20.98 on a per acre-foot basis as a fixed charge.

In other words, to get an

additional acre-foot of water, farmers in Berrenda Mesa paid only $12.53,
whereas, if the full district costs had been covered by the variable toll, the
price would have been $33.51 per acre-foot.

Given the elasticity of demand

figures presented earlier, the impact on the quantity of water demanded would
be very substantial had $33.51 rather than $12.53 been charged for the
marginal acre-foot of water.
To test the hypothesis that farmers change irrigation practice and
technology to conserve water when water prices are high, water costs were
correlated with irrigation efficiency for the Kern County water districts.
Irrigation efficiency was calculated as a ratio of the average per acre
consumptive use of water in the district to the amount of water delivered to
the district.

Since irrigation efficiencies are measured at the district and

not at the farm level, some of the water losses resulting in reduced
irrigation efficiency may have occurred before water was delivered at the farm
gate.

If so, on-farm irrigation efficiency may have been higher than those

reported in Table 3.
A correlation coefficient value of one would indicate a "perfect"
relationship between water cost and irrigation efficiency; a coefficient of
zero would indicate no relationship.

For both groundwater and surface water

the correlation coefficients are positive and closer to one than to zero:
groundwater, .732; for surface water, .642.

for

The indication is that higher

irrigation efficiencies are associated with higher costs.
One must be careful not to infer too much from the relationship between
water price and irrigation efficiency.

It might be a temptation to argue, for
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example, that large quantities of water could be saved in agriculture simply
by raising the price--water then could be moved to other uses, thus
forestalling costly new water development.

The problem with this line of

reasoning is that not all water saved on an individual farm or even in an
irrigation district is a net water saving for the basin as a whole.

Much of

the water lost, causing "low" irrigation efficiencies, returns to the water
system in the form of aquifer replenishment or surface return flows.
thus "recoverable" in a physical sense.

It is

Nearly all irrigated system leakage

as well as tailwaterl returns to the system and is available for future use.
Of course, it is important to recognize that recovering used water is not
costless, since pumping is required for groundwater reuse and water quality is
almost always reduced in the process of irrigation.
and other contaminants as it is used again and again.

The water picks up salts
For these reasons

farmers may find it profitable to invest in reducing water losses, even if the
water is recoverable.
Recoverable losses may be reduced by:
--Improved irrigation scheduling which helps in applying water in the
right amounts at the right time.
--Better drainage and salinity management which will reduce water needs.
--Automation of systems to increase application efficiency.
--Shorter irrigation runs (at the expense of more labor).
--Use of lined ditches or pipelines.
--Use of tailwater recovery systems.

lrailwater is the irrigation water that accumulates on the surface at the
lower end of the field and is available for further use.
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Water lost to evapotranspiration is lost to the entire water system and
is thus nonrecoverable.

If these losses can be reduced, there is an

augmentation to the system's supply.

Much research is being directed toward

finding ways of reducing evapotranspiration within existing cropping patterns
by controlling weeds and aquatic plants, and by limiting or eliminating cover
crops (Gardner et al., 1981).

Economists have important work to do in

evaluating the economic feasibility of reducing water losses, both recoverable
and nonrecoverable.
Water Price and Cropping Patterns
It has already been shown that among water districts in Kern County,
California, those with the highest water prices facing their farmers tend to
have the highest irrigation efficiencies.

Another response to higher water

prices might be a shift in cropping patterns to more water efficient or
higher-valued crops.
As water costs rise, farmers may plant more water efficient crops.

If

farmers can only grow field crops such as sugar beets, wheat, feed grains, and
cotton, because of climatic, soil, or market conditions, they may switch to
those that have lower ET requirements.
In a linear programming model of two "typical" 640 acre Yolo County,
California, farms--one with high grade soil, the other with medium
grade--Hedges (1977) showed how cropping patterns in the optimal mix would
shift as water prices rise.

The optimum cropping pattern for the high grade

soil farm at a zero water price called for 150 acres each of tomatoes, sugar
beets, and wheat plus 47 acres of alfalfa, 65 of beans and 38 of safflower.
As water prices were raised, alfalfa acreage was the first to be reduced,
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gradually dropping out entirely at $13.50 an acre-foot.I

Safflower--a low

water using crop--expanded in acreage as did barley which replaced sugar beets
at the highest water price $22.50.

Similar results were obtained for the

medium grade soil farm.
Seasonal evapotranspiration may also be reduced by shifting to a variety
of an existing crop that requires a shorter growing season.

Or, if climatic

conditions permit, farmers may plant earlier to avoid the hot season when high
evapotranspiration occurs.

At the limit, after all these adjustments have

been made, if the water is not available or if it costs too much, acreage may
have tq come out of crop production.
Another response that farmers might make to higher water prices is to
shift to higher (per acre) value crops.

Since water has become more expensive

relative to other inputs, the tendency is to use more of the latter to the
extent that they are substitutable.

This can mean using labor, land, and

capital more intensively which could bring on a crop mix change away from
field crops toward high-value (and high-cost) orchards, vineyards, and
vegetables.
Another reason for shifting to high-value crops as water prices rise
involves risk management.

High-value crops also tend to be high-risk

crops--both in terms of yields and prices (Lin, Dean, and Moore, 1974).
Higher water prices may induce farmers to abandon the low-average-profit,
low-risk crops in favor of high-value, high-risk crops.

lane of the indirect impacts of cropping pattern shifts not accounted for
in this analysis is the effect on prices. For example, reduced production of
alfalfa could be expected to increase alfalfa prices depending on the
elasticity of demand for alfalfa facing affected farmers. If the price rose
in response to decreasing supplies, less acreage would have to shift to other
crops in the process of reaching a new optimum. These price effects are
usually accounted for by employing a quadratic programming rather than a
linear programming model.
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To test the hypothesis that high water costs are associated with higher
valued crops, a cross-sectional analysis was made of 20 Kern County water
districts! using 1975 data from Watson, Nuckton, and Howitt (1980).

Recall

that surface water costs among the districts ranged from a high of $51.07 per
acre-foot in Cawelo to $6.68 in Delano-Earlimart; groundwater from a high of
$40.03 in Kern-Tulare to a low of $16.05 in Buena Vista (see Table 3).

A

weighted groundwater and surface water cost average was constructed and used
as an explanatory variable in two linear equations fitted by ordinary least
squares.
The dependent variable in the first equation was the percent of the
district's acreage in orchards, vineyards, or vegetables (high per acre
revenues and costs); in the second equation, the dependent variable was the
percent of the acreage in field crops (low-value crops).

(Rice was excluded

from the analysis because of its high water requirements and because its
cultivation in the area is determined primarily by soil and drainage
conditions.)
In the regression equations, a positive sign on the water price
coefficient would be expected in the first and a negative sign in the second.
Obviously, water price is not the only explanatory variable affecting cropping
patterns.
markets.

Others are soil and drainage, possibilities of frost, and available
The Kern County water districts cover areas in the foothills on the

east side of the valley, older production areas on the east side, areas on the
newer west side, and areas in the valley trough where soils are very heavy and
drainage is a serious problem.

In the regression, a soil variable was

1west Kern Water District was excluded from the group of districts
analyzed because in 1975 only 633 acres were planted and it was therefore an
insignificant part of the total acreage.
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included representing the percentage of the district's land with better soil
(scores of 60 and above on the Storie Index).

The expected sign of this

variable would be positive in the first equation and negative in the second.
Dummy variables were used to represent the combined influence of all variables
associated with location.
Equation.!_:_

Orchards, Vineyards, and Vegetables

OVV = -16.936 + 0.927 WWC + 0.242 SOIL+ 37.59 D1,
(2.16)
(1.62)
(3.75)
+ 3.182 D2
(0.32)

- 7.985 D3
(-0.55)

Numbers in parentheses are t values.

Equation~ Field Crops
FC = 102.03 - 0.988 WWC - 0.085 SOIL - 42.39 D1
(-2.13)
(-0.53)
(-3.91)
- 0.014 D2 + 16.565 D3
(-.001)
(1.06)
R2 = .72
where
OVV = percent of district acreage in orchards, vineyards, or vegetables.
FC = percent of district acreage in field crops, excluding rice.
WWC = weighted groundwater and surface water cost per acre-foot.
SOIL= percent of district acreage above 60 on the Storie Index.
D1 = 1 if district is in the foothills, 0 otherwise.
D2 = 1 if district is on the west side, 0 otherwise.
D3 = 1 if district is in the valley trough, 0 otherwise.
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The two equations explain the variation in the respective dependent
variables equally well (R2 = .72), and both water cost coefficients have the
expected signs and are statistically different from zero at the 97.5 percent
confidence level, using a one-tailed t-test (the first in the positive
direction; the second, negative).

The soil variable had the expected signs

but was not statistically significant.

The foothill dummy explained some of

the difference in cropping patterns among districts.

The statistically

significant coefficient reflects the fact that it is in the gently sloping
terrain of a nearly frost-free thermal belt in which many of the county's
orchards and vineyards flourish.
The conclusions of this section on the impacts of water price are quite
clear.
reasons.

The elasticity of demand for irrigation water is "high" for very good
Water price really matters because farmers can and do adjust by:

(1) using less water on a given crop, (2) undertaking investment that
increases irrigation efficiency, (3) substituting water-efficient crops for
those less efficient, and (4) shifting to crops which have higher nonwater
costs, higher risk and a higher per-acre value.
supporting all these conclusions.

Evidence has been presented

Then, are we to assume that water

allocation in agriculture is optimal?

Unfortunately, we cannot.

The reason

is to be found in the institutional framework that determines water pricing
and allocation.

In California, that framework centers on the water districts

and their management practices.
Institutions Governing Water Allocation in California
A fantastic array of private and public institutions exist in California
for the purpose of developing and allocating water resources.

They number in
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the thousands and employ operating rules established broadly by enabling
legislation.

These rules largely determine the distribution of economic rents

connected with water use and influence the efficiency of water development and
use.

The more significant institutions will be described briefly.
The important private entities are commercial water companies and mutual

water agencies--combined they number in the hundreds and are quite old.

Their

principal purposes are to establish rights to water use and to sell and
deliver water to users.

The mutual agencies sell water to members at supply

costs and are thus nonprofit.

The water companies sell water to customers

within their service areas (Wallace and O'Connell, 1966) at whatever prices
the market will bear, and the profits are distributed to stockholders as with
any other private company.

It is not known how much water is allocated by

these private entities, but the mutual companies are more frequently utilized
in irrigation, whereas the commercial companies are more heavily involved in
serving urban customers.
The public water districts of great significance in supplying water to
agriculture in California are the reclamation districts, authorized by
legislation in 1867; the irrigation districts, authorized in 1897; the water
districts, authorized in 1913; and the water storage districts, authorized in
1921.

Some of these districts and the quantities of water handled are listed

in Table 4.

Reclamation disticts' primary purposes are to reclaim and protect

lands from overflow and to irrigate lands both inside and outside the district
(Ibid.).

Irrigation districts supply, distribute, and salvage water for

beneficial use.

Water districts and water storage districts may produce,

store, and distribute irrigation water to individual farmers.
The significant point is that each of these public districts becomes in
essence a nonprofit wholesaler of water to farmers.

They may have water
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Table 4.
California's 15 Largest Federal and State Water Contractors,
Volume Delivered from October 1974 through September 1975.

Contractor

Volume Delivered
acre-feet

Principal
Source 8

Westlands Water District

1,250,279

CVP

Kern County Water Agency

788,409

SWP

Central California
Irrigation District

527,894

CVP

Municipal Water District-Southern California

479,565

SWP

Orland Water User
Association

252,788

CVP

Lower Tule River

223,000

CVP

Tulare Lake Water
Storage District

201,202

SWP

Arvin Edison Water
Storage District

191,200

CVP

Madera Irrigation
District

188,888

CVP

Tulare Irrigation
District

186,000

CVP

San Luis Canal Company

169,711

CVP

Delano-Earlimart
Irrigation District

168,100

CVP

Southern San Joaquin
Municipal Utility
District

138,700

CVP

Chowchilla Water District

129,867

CVP

Panoche Water District

113,745

CVP

San Luis Water District

104,291

CVP

Santa Clara Valley Water
District

103,745

SWP

Dudley Ridge Water
District

80,356

SWP

Firebaugh Canal Company

79,162

CVP

acvp • the Federal Central Valley Project

SWP • the State Water Project
Source:

State of California, The California Water Atlas,
Prepared by the Governor's Office of Planning and
Research in cooperation with the California
Department of Water Resources, 1979.

26
supply sources (including rights) of their own, both surface water and
groundwater, or they may be contractors for water developed by the federal
government through its Central Valley Project or by the State of California
through its State Water Project.

They are governed by boards of directors,

may have powers of eminent domain, and have the power to sell general
obligation bonds, levy water charges, and impose ad valorem taxes on
landowners within the district.
As argued in the introduction, economic rents are captured when the costs

of obtaining and using a resource are lower than its value in use.

Let us

suppose that a farmer has an annual entitlement of water of three acre-feet
per acre.

His average per acre-foot cost is $20, and its value in use is $30

per acre-foot.

As defined above, annual economic rent captured by the farmer

is $10 per acre-foot, or $30 per acre of irrigated land.

Total water rent

could be calculated by multiplying the per acre rent by the number of
irrigated acres operated by the farmer.

From our discussion thus far it must

be obvious that the annual income of our farmer is materially influenced by
the magnitude of the water rent.
His asset wealth position may likewise be affected by rent.

If the water

entitlement were an appropriative right that could be separated from any
particular parcel of land, the water right itself would be worth the
discounted present value of the flow of economic rents.

If the entitlement

were a riparian water right that was attached to riparian land, the flow of
economic rents would become capitalized in the value of the land itself.

If

the entitlement were a 20-year water contract with a public water agency, the
contract would take on a value reflecting the present value of the discounted
flow of rents over the contract period.

It follows that the wealth value of
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the annual water rents is influenced by the type of property right
incorporated in the entitlement.

The conclusion is that income and wealth

effects on farmers resulting from water use are a function of the magnitude of
economic rent and the nature of the property right in the use entitlement.
The pricing and allocation policies of the water districts described above are
crucial elements in determining what water costs and how much it is worth.
Let us first discuss some of the water pricing policies utilized by the
districts and analyze their allocative and distributive effects.

In

allocating a fixed quantity of developed water, allocative efficiency requires
that the marginal value of water consumptively used be equal, net of the costs
of transport, and assuming that marginal values include both private and
social benefits and costs.

In the development of new water, economic

efficiency requires that benefits from the proposed project exceed costs and
that development is permitted to proceed only so long as the marginal benefits
received from water supply exceed the marginal opportunity cost of the
resources needed to bring forth the new supply.

The district and agency

policies analyzed below somehow prevent the users of water from seeing the
relevant cost or value, and therefore the user decision in water allocation
are not economically efficient.

Given the elasticities of demand for

irrigation water presented earlier and the derived use values, a low marginal
cost for water means that farmers will want to use more of it than if the
marginal cost were higher.

In fact, if water were free to move among

prospective users without restriction and prices were free to seek equilibrium
levels, water prices should vary among users only by the cost of moving it
from one user to another.

This is the way the market works for other more

mobile inputs such as machinery, energy, and fertilizer.

Those users who can
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earn high economic rents in its use will bid it away from lower-rent users by
offering a price higher than the rent earned in the less valuable use.

Thus,

one way of judging whether or not water misallocation is occurring is to look
at the distribution of water prices among water districts net of transport
costs.
Recall once more the substantial differences in water price among water
districts in Kern County (Table 3).
pricing policies vary so much?

The intriguing question is why do these

There appear to be two important reasons, both

related to the sources of water supply available to a given district and what
they cost:

(1) Since a district is nonprofit, it must capture sufficient

revenues to meet its total financial obligations (most of which are tied up in
water costs which it incurs as a wholesaler) and at the same time sell the
water available; and (2) many of the districts have sold bonds in order to
create distribution facilities and these instruments are easier to sell if the
financial backing is in the form of fixed charges that are not dependent on
direct water sales.
There are several aspects to the first point.

Since (1) most districts

may sell water only to farmers inside the district boundaries, (2) they may
expect future use to be greater than present use and (3) running out of water
is costly, they tend to contract for "large" surface supplies, especially if
they are cheaper than expected costs of pumping groundwater.

If the district

has a large supply compared to its demand, the marginal cost (the variable
water toll) must be kept low so that the quantity available can be sold.

If

the resulting low toll generates insufficient resources to meet repayment
obligations, then the fixed charge or the land tax will need to be relatively
higher.

Of course, the reverse situation would call for high variable tolls
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(marginal costs) if surface supplies were short and the district is faced with
the need to pump expensive groundwater.

Since the districts have varying

expectations of future demand, different groundwater alternatives and
different financial obligations, the mix of fixed charges and variable tolls
are highly variable among districts.
This relationship between revenues generated and variable water tolls can
create financial problems for the district.

If demand for water were highly

inelastic, an increase in the variable toll would not reduce the quantity
demanded very much, and the toll would be an effective instrument in raising
revenues for the district.

If, however, as the above review of elasticities

indicated, demand elasticity approaches unity and may sometimes even exceed
it, increasing the water toll may not increase revenues at all.

The increase

in price would be more than offset by reductions in the quantity demanded.
wonder several of the districts rely heavily on a fixed charge.

No

If they must

increase revenues to cover their costs, that would seem to be their only
alternative.
The water costs to the district are also obviously crucial in determining
the variable toll charged the farmers; if the costs are low the water toll
will be low.

Those with the low tolls, Buena Vista, Delano-Earlimart, Kern

Delta, North Kern, Shafter-Wasco, and Southern San Joaquin, either get the
bulk of their supplies from old rights to the Kern River at very low costs or
from the Central Valley Project (CVP), where ability-to-pay pricing procedures
have produced low contracted rates for very long periods of up to 40 years.
Those districts charging high rates generally receive higher cost state water
and/or are heavily dependent on expensive groundwater.
It would appear that the economic rents captured by the water users are
highly variable, given this evidence from Kern County.

Even though demand
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studies have not been made in each district that would reveal what the use
value of water is, similarities in cropping patterns would suggest use values
that are not as disparate as water costs.

If economic rent is defined as the

difference between per unit water value and cost, the upshot is that high cost
districts would be capturing lower rents than low cost districts.
Of course, over the longer run if higher annual economic rents are
"secure," they would tend to get capitalized into higher land values.
gains would be captured by landowners.

Wealth

If the land were sold to new owners,

the favorable economic rents attributable to water procurements would be
offset by higher land costs, ceteris paribus.

Thus the original landowner

would capture the bulk of the benefits of the higher water rents.
Unfortunately, no systematic studies have been made of the land market in Kern
County that would establish empirically the relationship between water rents
and land prices.
This policy of combining variable tolls with fixed charges may be
perfectly sensible as viewed by the district's management that must raise
revenues to cover cost.

It may not be socially optimal if efficient water

allocation is a significant policy goal.

If quantities demanded were free to

adjust so that the marginal value of water would be equal to the variable
water toll, then great variation in the toll implies great variation in the
marginal value of water among users.

This, in turn, suggests that water

reallocation from uses and users of low value to high value would increase
water's economic productivity.
There is substantial empirical evidence that water values are highly
disparate, even within agriculture.

Noel, Gardner, and Moore (1980) published

a Yolo County, California study of conjunctive use of groundwater and surface
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water, allocated by several water agencies.

The groundwater aquifer was

partitioned into six basins which differed in pumping costs and surface water
costs.

An economic-hydrologic linear quadratic control model was used to

estimate the marginal values of irrigation water in the six basins.

The range

was large--from $2.44 per acre-foot in an area near the Sacramento River where
surface water is plentiful and cheap and the pumping lift was less than 20
feet, to $61.13 in another area scarcely 25 miles away, where water is pumped
from more than 100 feet.

This disparity in values suggests that large

economic gains could be captured by water transfers from areas of low value to
areas of high value.

These transfers do not occur because of institutional

impediments that result from the mish-mash of water law and administrative
practices that are used at the water district, state, and federal levels.

The

most significant of these will be discussed below.
A common pricing policy, particularly by districts in the Sacramento
Valley, is to impose a fixed per acre water charge which varies by crop.

As

a

typical example, one irrigation district which sells large quantities of water
to rice farmers, announced water rates, effective February 7, 1980, as:
$17.25 per acre flooded for rice; $12.10 per acre irrigated for sugarbeets and
tomatoes; $10.35 per acre irrigated for pasture, clover, ear corn, alfalfa,
and orchard; and $6.90 per acre irrigated for general crops (barley, vine
crops, wheat, milo, other cereal grains, and silage corn).

The announcement

also specifies that the regular rates apply to three irrigations (except for
rice).

Water quantities delivered are not measured.

Lands outside the

district may be supplied with water if prior agreement has been made with the
irrigation district's board of directors, but per acre water charges outside
will be twice the announced per acre inside charges.
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Such a policy violates the requirements of economic efficiency.

Since

the water charge is not related to the quantity applied or consumptively used,
at the margin the water cost is zero.

A sugar beet grower would pay the same

flat rate to apply 45 inches of water as for 35 inches per acre, a rice grower
could get 10 acre-feet for the same total cost as six.

(Of course, other

costs involved in irrigation, such as the irrigator's wage, however, may
constrain water use.)

Under this pricing policy there is little incentive for

conserving water by careful irrigation practice.
Another problem with the fixed per acre charge is that some crops bear
higher water costs than others per acre-foot used consumptively.

Alfalfa and

pasture in the area consumptively use about 48 inches of water annually, rice
about 56 inches on average.

Most of the other crops use much less.

In the

example cited above, it is apparent that growers of alfalfa, pasture, and
probably rice are receiving economic rents much higher than they would if
water were priced at equal per acre-foot rates for all crops.

Tomatoes and

sugar beet growers appear to be capturing smaller water rents than if per
acre-foot prices were equal.

If the fixed per acre charge were replaced with

an economically efficient per acre-foot toll that was the same for all crops,
it is likely that substantial shifts in cropping patterns would ensue.

This

question should be researched to determine the extent of the current
misallocation.
One of the reasons commonly given for pricing water on a per acre basis
is the difficulty and cost of determining how much is delivered to a given
farmer.

This is especially true for surface water diversions and for riparian

users of water courses.

Still, meters, weirs, and other measuring devices are

available, and there is little doubt that their implementation would permit a
more efficient pricing policy.
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Land or water taxes, imposed on all landowners in a district to raise
district revenues, are even farther removed from direct water use than per
acre charges.

Nearly all districts allocating water in California have

legislative authorization to levy taxes and many do, especially those selling
urban water.

In an efficiency sense, it makes little difference to water use

decisions whether taxes so raised are used to pay off fixed indebtedness or to
cover current operations and maintenance costs.

In either case the amount of

the tax is divorced from the quantity of water used and thus has no impact on
water allocation at the margin.

High cost water that may not be economically

justified in the sense that benefits exceed costs may be paid for by spreading
the costs among district taxpayers, some of whom may use little or no water.
The tax may be an effective instrument for raising district revenues, but it
is inefficient as a mechanism for producing efficient new water development,
for allocating water to its highest valued uses, and for providing incentives
to economize on the amount of water used.
In its allocative effects, perhaps the most pernicious of all pricing
practices commonly utilized in the water districts and by the water agencies
is so-called price averaging.

Some hypothetical numbers will permit us to see

how averaging works, why it promotes uneconomic water development, and how
economic rents are affected.

Suppose an existing supply of water delivers

3 acre-feet per acre to the district's farmers and the average cost is $10
per acre-foot, the price which the farmer pays.

Suppose the average value of

this water is $20 per acre-foot, which means the farmers are capturing a rent
of $10 per acre-foot.

Let us assume a new supply source might be made

available to the district which would double the water supply and which would
cost $25 per acre-foot.

If the average value of existing water can be taken
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as the marginal value, it is apparent that the farmers would not want the
additional supply if they had to pay $25 per acre-foot.
of it and the new water would not be developed.

This would be the end

What the district commonly

does, however, is average the old and the new water costs; in our example,
this average is $17.50.

This is still below the average value of water so

there is demand for the new supply.

The effect of this price blending is to

distort the true supply price of the new water.

The upshot is that uneconomic

supplies get developed and per acre-foot rents are diminished.
To make matters even worse, the district might use this practice to
expand its acreage.

In this case there would be a transfer of rent from the

farmers on the original acreage to those on the new.

Not only does uneconomic

water get developed, but it is allocated to new land that otherwise would not
be producing crops.

Empirical analysis is also needed to quantify this type

of misallocation.
A vivid example of price averaging and its effects on water rents is
provided by a proposal by the Bureau of Reclamation.I

The separable costs

assigned to irrigation for new agricultural water supplies forthcoming from
the proposed Auburn Dam have been estimated at approximately $63 per
acre-foot.

(Agricultural water users do not pay interest charges on the

capital costs of constructing new projects).

For the sake of argument, let us

assume that this figure is a true representation of the marginal supply costs
of the new irrigation water.

Only if water is worth $63 per acre-foot is it

economically efficient to develop it.

Repayment capability budgets of the

lrnformation given in a talk by Dave Schuster, Assistant Director,
Mid-Pacific Region, U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, "What's Ahead in Water
Pricing," to the Association of California Water Agencies, 1981 Fall Workshop
Conference, Monterey, November 19, 1981.
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Bureau, however, suggest that, in general, farmers could not afford such high
water prices.

Current Bureau prices in California are far lower--generally

from $2.50 to $15 per acre-foot.
What is proposed is to spread the costs of the new water over all users
of federal water, existing users as well as new users.

Some of the existing

users are far removed from Auburn Dam and the area of intended use.

By

averaging the cost in this fashion, the water rates to all existing users
would rise by $3.25 per acre-foot.

Short of a law suit, existing users

would have no say in the matter; the new rates would simply be imposed.

The

upshot is that economic rents would be reduced by $3.25 per acre-foot on all
existing users.
The efficiency implications are indeed ominous:

(1) almost any project,

regardless of water costs, could be justified and paid for by this mechanism,
and (2) the increase in price to all users may drive water costs above its
worth and cause previously economic production to be uneconomic and thus
misallocate resources.

The equity implications are no less objectionable:

the imposition of the equivalent of a water tax without the consent of the
affected irrigators.
Policies of both the Department of Water Resources of the State of
California, which administers the State Water Project, and the Bureau of
Reclamation, which administers the federal Central Valley Project,
differentiate between contracted (entitlement) water and surplus water.
Entitlement water is contracted for long periods of time and usually well in
advance of delivery, and the supply agency must plan to meet the requirements
of these contracts.

Because of random climatic variables and the need to

provide a firm supply of entitlement water, the quantity in the entitlement is
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less than is available in all but the dry years.

For state entitlement water

the rules specify that the water price must cover the pro-rata share of the
fixed capital costs of the project as well as the variable costs of delivery.
In the federal case, the water price on contracted water is usually determined
by an ability-to-pay rule.
Because contracts are long-term instruments and growth in use is assumed,
in the early years of the contract the contractors are often unable or
unwilling to take all the water available.

As

stated above, year-to-year

variation in precipitation affects the supply as well.
some water is usually available as "surplus."

For these reasons,

Surplus state water is sold at

the variable costs of delivery which depend on how far the water must be
transported and how much it costs to pump it through the system.

Federal

surplus water is also sold below contracted prices and has been used to
replenish groundwater aquifers in years of plentiful supply.
An interesting example of surplus water allocation is provided in Kern

County.

The Kern County Water Agency _i s a water broker for several of the

water districts discussed earlier.

For most years in the last decade it has

been receiving large quantities of state surplus water because the
Metropolitan Water District in Southern California has not been using its full
entitlement.

Perhaps it soon will, however, as 650,000 acre-feet of Colorado

River water now flowing to Southern California might be lost to Arizona
beginning in the mid-1980's.

In the meantime, the question that concerns us

here is how the Kern County Water Agency decides who should receive the
"cheap" surplus water and thus capture the economic rents.

The price

averaging process among districts is a mechanism whereby the agency can spread
these "goodies" around.
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The water law in California presents some obstacles as we look for
possibilities for developing markets to efficiently allocate water.
Individual water users do not themselves own the water rights--the water
companies and often districts do.

In California, the federal Bureau of

Reclamation and State Department of Water Resources are permittees of the
State Water Resource Control Board, which has ultimate jurisdiction over water
rights.

Contractors of these agencies technically do not hold any permanent

water rights beyond their contracts.

They are given options to purchase water

from the districts on terms specified in the contract.

For its part, the

district is bound by contract to supply water so it isn't really free to
negotiate the sales of water rights or even water rentals unless it has
surplus available.

In the case of State Project water, any changes in

contracts or in points of diversion must be approved by the Director of the
Department of Water Resources.
to be difficult to obtain.
transfers at all.

This type of administrative approval is likely

The ultimate water users are powerless to make any

The most they can do is simply forfeit their use of water,

but usually they are committed by contract to take a certain amount.

The

result is an inflexible and inefficient water allocating system.
This complicated milieu of water allocation by the water districts in
California is no doubt what led researchers of the Rand Corporation to argue
that the treatment of water rights is one of the most crucial factors in
achieving efficiency of water use and that title to water should be passed
from the water district to the water user, thus providing full economic
incentives to transfer water to parties valuing its use more highly (Phelps,
et al., 1978).
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Conclusion
One might interpret the foregoing discussion as being pessimistic that
much can be done to improve the efficiency of water allocation in California.
That would be an erroneous interpretation.

Water policy is dynamic and

responsive to economic pressures, and the next decade is likely to bring many
changes in the rules of water pricing and allocation.

These changes will

probably have a significant impact on the economic rents captured by water
users.
Water users themselves are taking significant steps to improve water
mobility in time and space.

Market-like arrangements are developing in many

situations where conditions are conducive.

Some districts that have capacity

are storing water for other districts, both above and below the ground, at
terms mutually acceptable.

Within districts, some farmers with relatively

inexpensive groundwater are selling their surface water to other farmers who
have either expensive groundwater or none at prices which benefit both
parties.

These developments are immensely encouraging and should be supported

by effective legislation and administrative policies.
At the federal level the 1902 Reclamation Act that restricts the acreage
receiving federal water under one owner to 160 acres is likely to be replaced
by legislation that is much more liberal.

Bills being considered by the

Congress would expand the restriction to 960 acres of owned land.

The

question of whether or not additional acreage may be leased is being hotly
debated, as is the issue of whether or not to require owner residency on or
near the land.

Some versions of the proposed legislation would require

irrigators to pay the full supply cost of federal water utilized on acreages
over 960 acres, including an interest charge on the capital stock.

The
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impact on the economic rent earned by water could be substantial.

What water

is worth per acre-foot is related to the size of farm if economics of size
exist.

Rents will no doubt be less if water prices are increased more than

the value of water increases in use.

When land receiving subsidized water Js

rented, it is not clear a priori whether the lessor or the lessee captures the
water rent.

It would depend on the characteristics of the land rental market

and who has market power.
At the state level also there are changes pending.

The electorate will

decide in June of 1982 whether or not to build the Peripheral Canal to move
water around the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta to the San Joaquin Valley and to
Southern California.
water sales.

This and other costly state projects must be funded by

Water prices, and thus water rents, will be affected.

Even if

no new water is developed, water prices will be much higher as new contracts
are negotiated in 1984 due to increases in energy costs.

My guess is that in

most situations water prices set by administrative fiat will increase faster
through time than the value of water and therefore economic rents will
decline.

Also, the quantity of water demanded will decline substantially as

farmers adjust by using less water on a given crop, use more water-efficient
technology, and shift to more water-efficient and higher-valued crops.

This

probably menas that the state will encounter greater difficulties than at
present in finding contracting buyers of irrigation water.
Those irrigators who have either riparian private water sources
with firm rights and can get water cheaply will continue to capture large
water rents and their land prices will continue to escalate relative to those
irrigators who must pay the higher water prices.
cg 12/29/81 C-9
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